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ABSTRACT

Kuhn’s analysis of the structure and function of the scientific community has been recently re-interpreted as a seminal contribution to the so-called social epistemology of science. Kuhn’s social epistemology should be considered as part of a normative-descriptive philosophical framework in which epistemological, historical, sociological, and psychological elements are interconnected. In this chapter, I will compare Kuhn’s seminal insights with two contemporary approaches to the social epistemology of science, namely: the development of idealised formal models of the scientific community and the use of qualitative studies for philosophical purposes. On the one hand, these contemporary approaches to social epistemology may be regarded as developing some of Kuhn’s views in new and exciting ways. On the other hand, however, it is still not entirely clear which kind of general philosophical ‘image of science’ they are contributing to. This chapter, therefore, aims at illuminating how analysing some of the contemporary debates in social epistemology through the lenses of Kuhn’s philosophy may recast under a new light the issue of the value of the study of the social dimension of scientific research for general philosophy of science.

 

Cite this article:

Politi, V. (2024). Kuhnian Lessons for the Social Epistemology of Science. In: Shan, Y. (eds) Rethinking Thomas Kuhn’s Legacy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 345. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64229-6_3

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64229-6_3