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Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA‑UAB)

Feroz Khan: “The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz hits the poorest”

11 May 2026
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The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered a crisis that goes far beyond its geopolitical implications. Accidents or deliberate attacks involving the oil tankers that remained trapped, could trigger an ecological disaster with long-lasting consequences for the region’s unique ecosystems.

Feroz Khan, a doctoral researcher at ICTA-UAB warns that countries in South and Southeast Asia, as well as those in Central and Southern Africa, will be the most affected by this blockade.

FEROZ KHAN, ICTA-UAB RESEARCHER
ICTA-UAB researcher Feroz Khan is an expert on disaster anthropology and environmental studies

In this interview, Feroz Khan analyses how structural dependence on imports and the potential environmental impact of an accident or attack could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe for millions of people.

What risks does a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz pose from the perspective of social inequalities?

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz places enormous pressure on a system that is already extremely unequal. It is important to remember a few things: oil and gas are not the only commodities that pass through the strait. Approximately 50% of the global urea supply and one third of global seaborne fertilizer trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz. The blockade is therefore having major impacts on the agriculture of countries that rely heavily on these inputs.

Which countries are these?

Precisely those that were subject to the reforms of the Green Revolution era, where local agricultural practices were replaced by large-scale industrial agriculture dependent on fertilizers. But oil also matters, of course. The World Bank has identified countries such as Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Myanmar as particularly vulnerable. These countries are vulnerable to disruptions in fuel prices because they have limited domestic oil reserves, low purchasing power, and fewer tools to access alternative fuel sources—unlike, for example, China, which has accumulated oil reserves, or India, which is pivoting towards purchasing Russian oil. If urgent measures are not taken, a “cascade” of impacts can be expected over the coming year.

What impacts does the international community foresee in light of fertilizer shortages and rising food prices?

The FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) warns of severe disruptions: lack of access to fertilizers will alter planting windows, harvests will be smaller, and the price of staple crops will rise in many of these regions. These are regressive impacts, as they disproportionately affect the poorest, who spend the majority of their household income on basic food. Inequalities within these nations, and between them and the wealthy world, will only worsen if these disruptions continue. These impacts also disproportionately affect women and girls: UN Women has warned that increased pressure on health systems and loss of livelihoods can translate into a greater burden of unpaid care work falling on women and girls, which is often linked to increases in violence against women.

Are these effects already being felt? What are the main problems this geopolitical conflict is causing?

Yes, the impacts are already being felt. Disruptions in fuel prices will generate inflation, because fuel is a key input across so many systems. In Sudan, for example, water infrastructure depends heavily on diesel—entirely imported from the Gulf—and with supply disruptions, prices have surged by around 80% according to some recent estimates. It should also be remembered that Sudan is already facing a severe humanitarian crisis as a result of a war financed and driven by the activities of the United Arab Emirates and its proxy militias; if one looks at Sudan’s total exports and the role that Sudanese gold plays in the UAE’s luxury economy, these relationships become clear, and the UAE’s aggression has been widely condemned. Fuel price disruptions cascade across everything from water to food and basic services, and when humanitarian aid is also delayed and unable to arrive—again, because the Strait is blocked—we are faced with a compound emergency.

Are there particular social groups or regions that are being especially affected?

If one looks at a map of shipping flows from the Strait of Hormuz before the war and compares it with the current situation, it is countries in South and Southeast Asia and those in Central and Southern Africa that will be most affected. Schools in Pakistan are already partially closed, and civil servants in Vietnam and Sri Lanka have had to reduce their working hours. Their dependence on imports is no coincidence: the entire history of injustice in global development makes clear that these dependencies were created and sustained by policies imposed by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), through instruments such as Structural Adjustment Programs. Attempts to develop more sovereign and sustainable agricultural systems are hindered and blocked by the reforms of the Green Revolution era. This was clearly demonstrated during the farmers’ protests in India a few years ago, and has been extensively studied by numerous scholars in fields such as critical agrarian studies.

In your opinion, are there ways to protect the most vulnerable populations?

There is the urgent and then the important—that is, the longer-term structural transformation that is needed. In the short term, one of the main demands of the IRC (International Rescue Committee), for example, is the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to ensure that emergency aid—including medicines and many other urgently needed supplies currently stranded in the Gulf—can pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In the long term, at a global scale, this crisis highlights that continued dependence on fossil fuels—for everything from agriculture to water pumps, transport, and electricity—is imprudent and unsustainable. We need an immediate transition towards decarbonization and a post-fossil economy. It is no coincidence that countries such as Spain and others that have heavily invested in renewable energy have more room for manoeuvre in this situation and can position themselves more strongly. Energy sovereignty, decarbonization, and strategies such as degrowth have a fundamental role to play.

What structural changes do you consider necessary to avoid future crises like this one?

We did not learn the lesson of the COVID-19 crisis, which exposed how many supply chains are optimized for efficiency rather than resilience, making them vulnerable to disruptions. We urgently need a transformation that moves us away from fossil fuels and the petrodollar system, and towards more resilient, sustainable, and post-growth economic planning models. We also need reparations. These years of war—in Palestine, Iran, Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere—have imposed enormous burdens of suffering on the populations of these regions. It is essential that aggressor states, such as Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, pay reparations for the damage caused by their actions. This is a mechanism enshrined in international law and, as Pedro Sánchez recently argued in Beijing, we urgently need to build a new multipolar world order centered on states upholding international law rather than resorting to the “law of the jungle.”

What role can Spain play in these crises?

Spain has played an exceptionally strong role in this regard and should continue to do so thanks to its commitment to energy sovereignty. It can do much more by adopting more resilient post-growth economic models and leading the integration of sustainability with resilience to disruptions.

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