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'A common structure of all strategy-proof rules' de Jorge Alcalde
Conferencias y congresos
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Aula Seminario
Descripción:
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, de la Universidad Pública de Navarra, presentará el próximo 4 de marzo, junto con Marc Vorsatz, su investigación que tiene por título: "A common structure of all strategy-proof rules".
Abstract:
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that in the universal preference domain, all non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rules are of range two. We say that an individual preference domain is non-conditionally restricted if it can be obtained from the universal preference domain by fixing a set of binary restrictions. Our main result establishes that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility also holds if the preference domain of each agent is non-conditionally restricted. This has implications for any possible cartesian product of preference domains. On the one hand, it directly states an impossibility if all individual domain restrictions are non-conditional. Since the universal preference domain is non-conditional, this generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. On the other hand, if at least one individual domain restriction is conditional, our result provides a strategy to characterize all strategy-proof rules.
Abstract:
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that in the universal preference domain, all non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rules are of range two. We say that an individual preference domain is non-conditionally restricted if it can be obtained from the universal preference domain by fixing a set of binary restrictions. Our main result establishes that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility also holds if the preference domain of each agent is non-conditionally restricted. This has implications for any possible cartesian product of preference domains. On the one hand, it directly states an impossibility if all individual domain restrictions are non-conditional. Since the universal preference domain is non-conditional, this generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. On the other hand, if at least one individual domain restriction is conditional, our result provides a strategy to characterize all strategy-proof rules.
Ubicación: Aula Seminario
Fecha: Miércoles 4, Marzo de 2020 - 13:15h