I am currently the principal investigator (DFG "Eigene Stelle") of a project entitled Kant, transcendental strategies, and philosophical antinomies, which I am running at Goethe University Frankfurt. The project aims to show that we can better understand Kant's method in the Critique of Pure Reason if we read the latter book as an attempt to solve some relevant philosophical antinomies, rather than as an answer to a Cartesian or a Humean skeptic. The main outcome of the project will be a book on Kant's Method in the Critique of Pure Reason.
During my stay at UAB I have worked on a chapter of this book, on Kant’s criticism of Hume’s skepticism. I have also collaborated with Thomas Sturm on a joint project on the role of systematicity in Kant’s understanding of the sciences.
Visiting doctoral researcher
Department of Philosophy & Centre d'Història de la Ciència (CEHIC). Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
I am a PhD candidate visiting the Department of Philosophy & Centre d'Història de la Ciència (CEHIC) for a two-week research stay to work with Professors Thomas Sturm and Annette Mülberger. My doctoral research project at the Descartes Centre (Utrecht University) is on the disciplinary formation of psychology in the second part of the 20th century. I work under the supervision of Bert Theunissen and Ruud Abma. The project consists of two parts: a large-scale data-mining of the journal literature in psychology (conducted in close collaboration with Nees Jan van Eck at Center for Science and Technology Studies, Leiden University) and content analysis of introductory psychology textbooks. In Barcelona, I am working with Professor Sturm on extending my research project with an investigation of the epistemological discussions surrounding the replication crisis in psychology. The questions I aim to explore during my two weeks here are: (1) what are the philosophies of sciences that are taken as normative descriptions of scientific practice by the psychologists involved in the replication debates; and (2) can we, as historians and philosophers, use the discussions about the replication crisis to investigate the internalized (what I call “homegrown”) philosophies of science of the psychologists involved.