Agenda

Descripció:

“Trading in Networks”

A càrrec de:  Andrea Galeotti (European University Institute)

Ubicació: IAE Seminar Room

Data: Dimarts 23, Maig de 2017 - 13:00h

Descripció:

A càrrec de:  Doug Gollin (Oxford University)

Ubicació: IAE Seminar Room

Data: Dimecres 24, Maig de 2017 - 13:00h

Descripció:

A càrrec de:  Salvador Barberà (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

Ubicació: Seminar Room B3-123A

Data: Dimecres 24, Maig de 2017 - 13:15h

Descripció:

Seminari a càrrec de: Elena Manresa (MIT Sloan School)

Abstract

We study panel data estimators based on a discretization of unobserved heterogeneity when individual heterogeneity is not necessarily discrete in the population. We focus on two-step grouped-fixed effects estimators, where individuals are classified into groups in a first step using kmeans clustering, and the model is estimated in a second step allowing for group-specific heterogeneity. We analyze the asymptotic properties of these discrete estimators as the number of groups grows with the sample size, and we show that bias reduction techniques can improve their performance. In addition to reducing the number of parameters, grouped fixed-effects methods provide effective regularization. For instance, when allowing for the presence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity we show they enjoy fast rates of convergence depending on the underlying dimension of heterogeneity. Finally, we document the finite sample properties of two-step grouped fixed-effects estimators in two applications: a structural dynamic discrete choice model of migration, and a model of wages with worker and firm heterogeneity.
 

Ubicació: Seminar room AULA A

Data: Dijous 25, Maig de 2017 - 15:00h

Descripció:

“Family Planning and Development: Aggregate Effects of Contraceptive Use”

A càrrec de Cezar Santos (FGV)

Ubicació: IAE Seminar Room

Data: Dilluns 29, Maig de 2017 - 13:00h

Descripció:

 
A càrrec de Jordi Peridiguero (UAB) amb la col·laboració de J. Artés i J. L. Jiménez.
 
Abstract

This paper analyzes the financial implications of disseminating information about corruption. In particular, we study how the revelation of local corruption affects public finances. We use data from Spain during the period 2003-2010 and match municipalities that suffer a corruption scandal with a control sample of similar municipalities. We use two identification strategies. The first one matches each municipality in which a scandal has been revealed to a corrupt municipality in which the scandal has not yet been revealed. The second strategy matches municipalities with corruption scandals to similar municipalities without corruption scandals and then implements a differences-in-differences regression to isolate the causal effect. We find that after corruption is revealed, both revenues and expenditures decrease significantly (approximately by 8% and 7%, respectively) in corruption-ridden municipalities compared to the counterfactual group. The effect comes mostly from other economic agents’ unwillingness to fund or start new infrastructure projects in municipalities where corruption has been revealed.

Ubicació: Seminar room AULA A

Data: Dilluns 29, Maig de 2017 - 15:00h